Airtable and Miro were acquired in the past thirty days at valuations 88% and 92% below their respective 2021 funding rounds, establishing a new benchmark for how far late-stage venture portfolios must reprice. Airtable last raised at $11.7 billion in December 2021; its acquisition closed at an enterprise value near $1.4 billion. Miro raised at $17.5 billion in January 2022 and sold for approximately $1.4 billion. Both companies generated revenue in the high nine figures, carried enterprise software multiples above ten in their last private rounds, and found buyers at multiples closer to three.
The pattern is not isolated. Approximately 1,200 companies raised Series C or later rounds between Q4 2020 and Q1 2022 at valuations exceeding $1 billion, according to PitchBook data cross-referenced with SEC filings. Roughly 340 of those companies have not raised follow-on capital since mid-2022, suggesting their cap tables still reflect marks two to three years stale. The median discount observed in the fifteen venture-backed exits that did occur in 2024 was 71% to the prior round. Airtable and Miro now anchor the tail.
This matters because the backlog is large and the exit window is narrow. Public software multiples compressed from a median of 12.3x forward revenue in December 2021 to 4.8x by December 2024, per Meritech Capital's SaaS index. Private equity buyers, who absorbed much of the venture exit flow in 2023, have pulled back; disclosed PE take-private volume in software fell 42% year-over-year through November 2024. Secondary volume rose 23% in the same period, but secondary buyers demand discounts that force down-round pricing into the open. The Airtable and Miro transactions were both strategic acquisitions—Thoma Bravo and Salesforce Ventures participated as financial sponsors in the Airtable deal, while a consortium led by an undisclosed strategic took Miro—but the pricing discipline now extends across buyer types.
Venture funds carrying these marks face two pressures. Limited partners conducting annual valuations will reference public-market comparables and recent transaction prices; the National Venture Capital Association's Q3 2024 guidelines explicitly cite "recent M&A of comparable companies" as a primary adjustment factor. Fund managers who marked Airtable-like companies at last-round valuations through year-end 2023 now hold assets worth, on average, one-third of stated NAV if the Airtable-Miro pattern holds. This affects distribution waterfalls, GP carry calculations, and the ability to raise successor funds. Vintage 2021 funds are entering their third year; LPs expect liquidity events by year five.
Operators and allocators should watch three follow-on events. First, Q1 2025 venture fund NAV letters, due mid-April, will reveal which GPs took markdowns and by how much; any fund reporting stable NAV on portfolio companies resembling Airtable or Miro becomes a valuation credibility test. Second, secondary bid-ask spreads for venture fund stakes will widen if sellers refuse to accept the new pricing regime; spreads above 30% typically freeze the market. Third, bridge financing and pay-to-play rounds will accelerate in Q2 as companies approach cash-out dates; covenant-light structures from 2021 expire starting March, and the replacement terms will clarify who controls the recap process.
The Airtable and Miro deals closed within three weeks of each other, both at near-identical enterprise values despite different revenue bases and end markets. That convergence suggests the buyers are pricing on cash-flow durability and gross margin, not growth. The companies that resemble them—high-burn SaaS platforms raised at double-digit revenue multiples—number in the hundreds, and the market now has a reference price.